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1 Introduction
We welcome this opportunity to respond to Wyssusek’s (2006) critique of our
work on the ontological foundations of conceptual modeling and, more generally, the ontological foundations of information systems. We appreciate his
interest in and his undertaking a careful analysis of our work. We hope, in
turn, that our responses will sharpen our discourse—to pinpoint more clearly
where we agree and where we disagree.
In the sections below, we first indicate briefly where we agree for the most
part with Wyssusek’s arguments. We then address in more depth those areas
where we are at odds with his views. Our goal is to debunk his arguments
about how our work is flawed. Next, we address two matters that we see as
incidental to Wyssusek’s and our respective positions. Nonetheless, these matters seem important to him in terms of his criticisms of our work. Finally, we
provide some brief conclusions.
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2 Matters of Agreement (For the Most Part)
In the first section of his paper, Wyssusek provides a brief explanation of the
importance of and history of conceptual modeling. In particular, he focuses on
the “yet another modeling approach” (YAMA) and “not another modeling
approach” (NAMA) syndromes that motivated our own work to find theoretical foundations for information systems. For the most part, we concur with his
account. He argues, however, that “[s]o far, claims made for the validity of the
BWW ontology1 have not been subjected to critical evaluation.” We disagree.
We have undertaken empirical tests of the “validity” of predictions based on
the ontology (e.g., Bodart et al. 2001; Gemino and Wand 2005), and other colleagues have undertaken similar “validation” tests (e.g., Parsons and Cole
2004, Burton-Jones and Meso 2006). Perhaps Wyssusek has a particular
notion of validity that we fail to understand. Perhaps he also has a particular
notion of “critical evaluation” that we fail to understand. For our part, we have
followed a time-honored tradition in science—namely, that the validity of theories needs to be tested empirically.
In the second section of his paper, Wyssusek begins with a discussion on
“the roots of conceptual modeling” in artificial intelligence, systems development, database development, programming languages, and human-computer
interaction. He provides a compelling account of why conceptual modeling
was eventually recognized as important in all these domains. We applaud and
concur with his arguments.
In the latter part of the second section of his paper, however, Wyssusek
comments: “Even if critics rarely explain why they believe a theoretical foundation would improve the practice of conceptual modeling, or, what they mean
by ‘theoretical foundations of conceptual modeling’, it appears that most critics implicitly or explicitly question the justification for the semantics of the
elements of the respective conceptual modeling language (a.k.a. “modeling
grammar”).” In our view, “critics” have been especially clear on why they
believe having a theory of conceptual modeling would improve the practice of
conceptual modeling. In the absence of theory, it is difficult to provide compelling predictions or explanations about conceptual modeling phenomena
(e.g., the strengths and weaknesses of a particular conceptual modeling grammar). Moreover, good theory is eminently practical (Van de Ven 1989).
Contrary to Wyssusek’s contention, we also believe that many (if not all)
“critics” have explained what they mean by the “theoretical foundations of
conceptual modeling.” Indeed, the matter is straightforward. Theory seeks to
account for some type of phenomena. The theoretical foundations of concep-
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tual modeling seek to account for different types of conceptual modeling phenomena (Wand and Weber 2002).
In the third section of his paper, Wyssusek provides an overview of
Bunge’s ontology. Wyssusek ascribes several fairly extreme positions to
Bunge – for instance, that deviations from realism and objectivism “can only
be explained out of a person’s mental insanity.” Whether these are a fair representation of Bunge’s positions, either in the past or currently, are best left for
Bunge himself to determine. Our understanding is that Bunge refers only to
“[t]he failure to distinguish the thing represented from its model” (Bunge
1977, p. 121). We believe that few will argue that confusing an actual phenomenon and its mental conception is desirable. We note also that Bunge has
worked extensively on the philosophy of the social sciences. He has a deep
understanding of the difficult issues surrounding social science topics like
realism, objectivism, and relativism.

3 Matters of Disagreement
The heart of Wyssusek’s disagreement with our work lies in the fourth section
of his paper, where he describes our adoption, adaptation, and use of Bunge’s
ontological theory. In the latter part of this section, he articulates four specific
issues that concern him. We address each below:

3.1 Our failure to adopt dialectical materialism
Wyssusek argues that our “adaptation of Bunge’s ontology lacks the ontological commitment that makes Bunge’s ontology what it is: a dialectical materialist, hence a realist ontology.” He further argues that our failure to adopt this
ontological commitment makes any reference we make to Bunge’s ontology
“void.”
We are not trained philosophers, and thus we feel ill qualified to enter a
lofty debate about what constitutes “dialectical materialism” and the merits of
this philosophical stance. Rather, our reasons for adopting Bunge’s ontology
are more mundane.
Like Bunge, we are realists (at least when we act as scientists). We believe
that a world of matter exists independently of humans as observers. Furthermore, we believe this world obeys laws of various kinds. Like many other scientists, however, we see no way to establish “true” knowledge of the material
world. Instead, as scientists we are part of a community of individuals who
seek to build concepts and theories that enhance our understanding of the
Y. Wand & R. Weber • 129
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material world. We accept the ephemeral nature of these concepts and theories. Indeed, an important goal of science is to articulate new concepts and theories and to refine existing concepts and theories which, according to some
type of criteria, enhance our understanding of the world.
As Wyssusek points out, Bunge also recognizes the conundrum he faces as
a realist—for instance, that the existence of one thing cannot be established
without first assuming the existence of another thing (e.g., a human). Moreover, as Wyssusek further points out, Bunge in his ontology speaks about
“model things.” For instance, for Bunge, properties of things are real because
they exist independently of the observer, but as humans we can only know
properties via our models of them, which he calls attributes. As models of
properties, attributes reflect our purposes in modeling some domain, and/or
they reflect our best understanding and knowledge of the domain.
Bunge also recognizes that the ongoing task for scientific realists is to find
what constitutes reality. Thus he says (Bunge 1979, p. 149): “Science attempts
to account for the reality behind appearance, so it either does not employ phenomenal predicates or, if it does, regards them as derived not basic. Surely
phenomena, in particular mental phenomena, are experientially immediate,
but they are neither ontologically nor scientifically primary: they are something to be explained.”
Like Bunge, our “commitment” is to model the world as best we can. More
specifically, in conceptual modeling, our commitment is to model someone
else’s model of the world as best we can. BUNGE is also committed to establishing whether scientific models of the world reflect reality or just appearances. We too share this commitment in our work on conceptual modeling. In
this regard, we might use our knowledge of conceptual modeling (and ontology) to assist individuals to better understand and model their world. Ultimately, however, it is their model. As information systems practitioners, our
role is to find the best way we can to represent their model of their world. Just
as the constructs in Bunge’s ontology can be used to model “appearances,”
they can be used also to model individuals’ models of their worlds. In other
words, we believe Bunge’s concepts are applicable not only to describing an
objective “true” reality but also to modeling beliefs about what exists and what
might occur in a given domain of the world.
We can summarize our approach in the form of two assumptions. First,
given that the purpose of conceptual modeling is to represent domains of the
world, the modeling constructs used should be matched to beliefs about the
domain. Second, Bunge’s constructs are an appropriate set for this purpose.
Our experience (and the experience of some of our colleagues and students) is
that Bunge’s constructs provide us with useful insights about how to better
represent individuals’ models. Furthermore, our work and the work of others
130 • Y. Wand & R. Weber
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have provided us with empirical evidence that predictions based on our two
assumptions indeed hold.

3.2 Bunge’s terminology and formalisms only
accidental to ontology
Wyssusek objects to our using Bunge’s formalisms without first having made
an “ontological commitment.” He comments: “without ontological commitment, the borrowing of constructs, formalisms, and terminology boils down to
using Bunge’s ontology as a language.” If we understand Wyssusek’s arguments correctly, this point is an elucidation of his first criticism above.
Clearly, in our use of Bunge’s work, we have ascribed meaning to the terminology and formalisms that he has used. This meaning is based on Bunge’s
explanations of the meaning of his terminology and formalisms, our interpretation of his explanations, and our knowledge and experience of the world. We
are not generating sentences (language) that might comply with the formal
rules of Bunge’s “grammar” but have no meaning for us.
Bunge’s position is manifested in the assumptions he has made in his ontology, such as (a) the world is made of (substantial) things, and (b) these things
possess properties. Even if we assume that adopting these assumptions
amounts to subscribing to a “dialectical materialistic” view of the world (or
any other ontological “position”), in our opinion we are simply “name calling”
(an action that has no bearing on the usefulness of the assumptions). What we
declare about our ontological position is not what matters. Rather, what is
important is the adoption of a set of ontological constructs that defines and
manifests our ontological position. Moreover, even if we were to “admit” we
are avid “dialectical materialists,” such an admission would have no consequences for the validity or usefulness of our approach.
Prior to our encountering Bunge’s ontology, each of us had over 15 years of
experience as a practitioner, student, teacher, and researcher in the information
systems field. We had encountered many concepts that were used extensively
in the information systems and computer science domains—for instance,
entity, attribute, system, subsystem, coupling, event, and process. Our frustration was that for the most part these critical concepts were not defined precisely, nor were they used consistently. In Bunge’s ontology, we found a
comprehensive, precise, and consistent account of many of these concepts. We
did not have to make any formal “ontological commitment” to his work. His
ontology simply made sense to us, so we used it. When we now converse
about concepts like objects, or methods, or systems, or classes, we have a
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shared understanding. Thus, by adopting Bunge’s concepts, we have acquired
a socially constructed reality that has utility for us.

3.3 Bunge’s ontology not concerned with how
humans structure their conceptions of the
world
Wyssusek argues that Bunge deems concepts to be “fictions” and not “concrete objects.” They “belong to” the domains of psychology, epistemology,
and methodology and not the domain of ontology. Thus, he claims our use of
Bunge’s work in the domain of conceptual modeling is misguided.
Earlier in his paper, Wyssusek has the following quote from Bunge (1977,
p. 119): “Theoretical science and ontology handle not concrete things but concepts of such, in particular conceptual schemata sometime called model
things.” In short, according to this quote from Bunge, ontology does “handle”
concepts in the form of conceptual schemata and model things. Bunge understands fully that the only way we can talk about the real world (or concrete
things) is via concepts. We have no way of knowing about the real world
except via our concepts. His two-volume work on ontology is a comprehensive, rigorous articulation of concepts that sentient beings might use to conceive the real world (e.g., via attribute predicates and functional schemata).
His ontology does not obviate the need to declare what is “out there” in the
world. For this reason, Bunge makes assumptions about the nature of and
existence of things, properties, compositions, systems, etc.
Similarly, conceptual modeling deals with concepts that we can use to
describe the world. To assess whether these concepts are useful, we need to
compare them with what we believe exists in the modelled domains and how
we conceive of these beliefs. Thus, contrary to Wyssusek’s arguments, we see
no conflict between Bunge’s views on ontology and our use of his ontology in
conceptual modeling.

3.4 Ignorance of the larger part of Bunge’s
ontology and the most relevant parts for
conceptual modeling
In our work on the theoretical foundations of conceptual modeling, Wyssusek
argues that we have ignored the larger part and most relevant parts of Bunge’s
work—in particular, Bunge’s work on semantics. It seems Wyssusek has
reached the view that we are ignorant of Bunge’s work because he does not
132 • Y. Wand & R. Weber
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like the ways we have adapted and used Bunge’s work. Of course, he is entitled to his views, and we respect his views.
As best we are able to understand Wyssusek’s position, he seems to be
arguing that (a) the ontological constructs proposed by Bunge have no meaning because they are formalisms, or (b) any meaning ascribed to the constructs
that is not Bunge’s meaning renders them invalid. In response, we quote
Bunge (1974, p. 56): “Finally, a warning: We are not claiming that a construct
is meaningless if it belongs to a theory, but only (i) that a construct has no
clear cut meaning but in the midst of a theory, (ii) that a construct may change
its meaning (i.e., it may become a different construct) if transplanted to a different theory, and (iii) that a theoretical construct exists only in a theory.”
Moreover, Bunge claims (1974, p. 194): Semantics “of factual science […]
has the following presuppositions of a metaphysical character: (i) there are
both constructs (in particular concepts) and physical objects (in particular
signs); (ii) some signs designate constructs and refer to physical objects; (iii)
the theories referring to physical objects constitute more or less adequate
(true) representations of aspects of the world.” Thus, Bunge links concepts,
signs, and physical phenomena.
Bunge’s constructs belong to a theory – his theory of ontology (see, especially, Bunge 1977, pp. 10–12). They have a meaning in the context of this
theory. As per his comments above, however, he recognizes that a construct
may change its meaning if transplanted in another theory. Surely, refinement
of existing theories, adaptation of existing theories, and development of new
theories is the stuff of science. Are we to proscribe such activities?

4 Two Other Matters
In the first part of the fourth section of his paper, Wyssusek provides a brief
history of our adaptation of Bunge’s work. For the most part, he is correct in
his recount of the history. Moreover, we do not wish to quibble about matters
of detail.
In his endnote 1, however, Wyssusek seems to take umbrage with our having relied on advice from our colleague, Mattessich, to attend to Bunge’s work
rather than our having performed a comprehensive search of alternative ontologies.
The fact that an eminent colleague referred us to Bunge’s work might or
might not be of interest to somebody (although it was fortunate for us). Not
only have we never concealed this fact, but we have been happy to mention it
at every appropriate opportunity. In any event, the way that scientists become
Y. Wand & R. Weber • 133
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aware of theories, techniques, or facts has little bearing on the validity or quality of their work. It is a common practice to consult colleagues who possess
knowledge a researcher does not have. Indeed, obtaining advice from colleagues by informal, “personal communications” is a common practice in the
conduct of science. Examples are the historical accounts of the development
of General Relativity (Pais 1982) and the discovery of DNA (Watson 1968).
This kind of communication is part of the venerable tradition of creating
cumulative knowledge.
In his endnote 2, Wyssusek argues that we have not provided convincing
examples of ontological questions that early researchers in conceptual modeling had been addressing prior to work on ontology gaining currency in the
information systems and computer science disciplines. Our response to this
criticism is straightforward. Early conceptual modeling researchers had been
striving to find better ways to model the world. How we describe the world is
surely a fundamental ontological question.

5 Conclusions
We conclude with a brief summary of our position and a reflection. In a nutshell, our position is the following:
•

•

•

•

•

Ontological beliefs exist in every human communication, independent
of whether they are created by language exchange, are based on observations, or just reflect inter-subjective reality agreed via some social
discourse.
In this light, every conceptual modeling grammar must be related,
explicitly or implicitly, to an underlying ontology. Otherwise, it carries
no meaning.
Based on our immediately preceding point, we have proposed a way to
evaluate the effectiveness of a conceptual modeling grammar, which is
based on a mapping to/from an ontology.
Whether one states one’s “ontological commitment” explicitly or not,
the fact that meaningful communication requires a shared ontology
implies such a commitment. This is true both for informal communications and the more formal conduct of science.
Choosing a specific set of ontological concepts, their relationships, and
premises underlying their application is a de facto ontological commitment. Whether the belief in such set can be ascribed to one school of
thought (such as “dialectical materialism”) or another has no effect on
the outcome of adopting an ontological system. What matters is the set
134 • Y. Wand & R. Weber
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•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

of beliefs about what exists and might happen in the world. Of course,
this set of beliefs has to be stated clearly.
The way a specific set of such constructs is determined (by direct
observation, via social interaction, or otherwise) has no bearing on the
effectiveness of their use. In other words, epistemological considerations, while indicating how one might arrive at a certain set of ontological beliefs, do not indicate whether the set is appropriate.
Whether a person is realist, constructivist, or relativist does not obviate
the need to use a set of constructs to describe the beliefs the person
holds about the world. Even relativists must use concepts to describe
their beliefs. Thus, irrespective of the source of one’s beliefs, they will
be manifested (implicitly or explicitly) by a set of assumptions of what
exists and what might happen in the world.
On a broader note, if we view information systems as representations,
then ontological concepts in general can inform our thinking about
information systems and information systems analysis and design.
The question of “which” ontology to use is an open one. Unless it is
pre-determined by agreement within a relevant community, we need to
“guess” the appropriate ontology.
In the absence of compelling evidence in favour of a specific ontology,
the final verdict about the validity of any ontology-based conclusions
must be based on empirical methods and outcomes.
The fact that we must first choose an ontology does not invalidate the
approach of using ontological concepts and premises to analyse conceptual modeling grammars specifically and information systems concepts in general.
Even if we find a specific set of ontological beliefs provides conclusions that are not corroborated by empirical methods, this outcome
would not invalidate the general idea of evaluating a modeling grammar by using a “benchmark” ontology.
We welcome any other suggestions about “competing” ontologies that
we might use. We would be delighted if someone suggests a specific
set of ontological beliefs that provides a better foundation for conceptual modeling than the one we have used.

Over the years we have used Bunge’s ontology, we have corresponded with
him occasionally about our work. As a result of our early work, we were
invited to contribute to a major volume on Bunge’s “Treatise on Basic Philosophy” (Wand and Weber 1990). In his response to our contribution, Bunge
(1990, p. 595) comments: “I welcome the use that Wand and Weber […] have
made of some of the ideas in my ontology to tackle problems in the foundaY. Wand & R. Weber • 135
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tions and philosophy of technology, particularly management science. I take it
as an admission of the fruitfulness of the systemic and realistic approach to the
study of systems of all kinds.”
Finally, as scientists we are always mindful of an old adage: “the proof of
the pudding is in the eating.” Whether our use, adaptation, and extension of
Bunge’s ontology have merit depends on the insights they provide about the
domains of conceptual modeling and information systems. This outcome we
can try to influence but cannot control. Rather, our colleagues and students
will be the final arbiters. They will adopt or discard our ideas depending on
how well these ideas contribute to their own understandings of the worlds with
which they choose to engage.

Notes
1.

While we understand that it might be useful to employ the acronym “BWW”
to describe our use of and adaptation of Bunge’s (1977; 1979) ontology, we
wish to be clear that the fundamental intellectual contributions are those made
by Bunge and not us.
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